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All systems, no matter what they are designed to do, have shortcomings that may make them
less productive than was hoped during the initial development. Such shortcomings can arise at
any stage of development: from conception to the end of the implementation life cycle. While
systems failure and errors of a lesser magnitude can occur as a function of mechanical or
software breakdown, the majority of such problems in aviation are usually laid on the shoulders
of the human operator and, to a lesser extent, on human factors (Nagel, 1988). The operator
bears the responsibility and blame even though, from a human factors perspective, error may
have been designed into the system.
Human factors is not a new concept in aviation. The name may be new, but the issues
related to operators in the loop date back to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century
and certainly to the aviation build-up for World War I. During this first global confrontation,
military services from all sides discovered rather quickly that poor selection and training led to
drastically increased personnel losses. While hardware design became an issue later, the early
efforts were primarily focused on increased care in pilot selection and on their training. This
actually involved early labor-intensive simulation, using such devices as sticks and chairs
mounted on rope networks which could be manually moved in response to control inputs.
The use of selection criteria and improved training led to more viable person-machine
systems. More pilots survived training and their first ten missions in the air, a rule of thumb
arrived at by experience which predicted ultimate survival better than any other. This rule was
to hold though World War II. At that time, personnel selection and training became very
sophisticated based on previous standards. Also, many psychologists were drafted into Army
Air Corps programs which were geared towards refining the human factor. However, despite
the talent involved in these programs and the tremendous build-up of aviation during the war,
there were still aircraft designs that were man killers (no sexism implied since all combat pilots
were men). One classic design error that was identified fifty years ago was the multipointer
altimeter, which could easily be misread especially by a pilot under considerable task load. It
has led to flying fully operational aircraft into the terrain (Fitts and Jones, 1947). The authors of
the research which formally identified this problem put "Human Errors" in quotes to express
their dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to accident investigation. It traditionally places
the burden of guilt on the operator. Some of these altimeters still exist in older aircraft to this
day.
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Human Factors in Complex Systems
The airspace system has become increasingly more complicated since the Second World War,
and an emphasis on aircraft issues alone would not do it service. The potential for chains of
events leading to system breakdown has increased with the volume of traffic and the complexity
of both air and ground subsystems. While the concept of human factors is not new, it is
continually being rediscovered or ignored by systems developers. In addition to cockpit crew
operations, the modern civil and military airspace system must include airport ground
operations, conducted by air traffic control, and maintenance of both air and ground
hardware/software. This latter area is handled by the airway facilities personnel in the FAA,
while the former is a function of airlines, the FAA, fixed base operators, and other airframe and
power maintenance resources.
All of these systems and subsystems have people working in them, and in cases like the
multipointer altimeter, the hardware and software are not user friendly. Systems have often
been created in which the operator was the last to know what was going on, and human factors
professionals only became involved by exception when the designers knew they had a problem.
In the latter case, it is not unusual for the designers to come to human factors people with a
request to find a better way to select and train because the hardware and software designs are
already frozen. This is a step back in time where human factors by whatever name was only
viewed as useful from the limited perspectives of training and selection.
Warm and Dember (1986) described their concerns over systems that are designed in such a
way that there may be attentional lapses to the point that operators are no longer "awake at the
switch." In such a situation, whether in aviation or not, the system is operating in "free flight"
without any supervisory control by human hand. The fact that this can and does happen became
clear several years ago when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission closed the Peach Bottom
power plant in Pennsylvania. Inspectors found operators literally asleep at their stations.
Obviously this problem was not identified and addressed during the development of the plant.
An example of a situation in which systems designers decided to evaluate their product
before it was too late was reported by Kantowitz and Sorkin (1983). A consumer electronics
company was designing a new answering machine that would have been the answer to all needs
of business and industry. The designers were convinced that they had a very marketable
product which would be quite profitable. However, someone decided that it would be
reasonable to test the product using a sample of people who were the intended users:
secretaries. They gathered a group of ten and provided the documentation and the equipment
and told them to go forth and use it. Not one could figure out how to operate the system. The
designers concluded that the problem had to be training, so they rewrote the documentation and
developed a basic training program. Another group of ten secretaries was mobilized. Of these
ten only two could learn to operate the system. They both had previous backgrounds in
computer programming. The designers had created a system for themselves and not for the
users. Fortunately, they had chosen to test. Had they attempted to market the product it would
have been a financial disaster.
Are there parallels between the answering machine example and the evolution of aviation
systems? Of course! Thomas (1985) described the development of air traffic control over a nine
year period in the 1950's and 60's. He noted the difficulty in transitioning from the older broad
band radars to the more modern narrow band digital systems. Part of the problem was not so
much a matter of system design but rather a function of preparation of the users to accept the
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newequipment.Further,therewerecapabilitiesin thenewerequipmentthattheoperators
tendedto useor notbasedontheirpreferencesandexperience.At thetime,verylittle
considerationof theuserswasapparenti systemdevelopment.Thisischangingslowly,and
modemATCsystemsoftenhavecontrollerpanelsinvolvedinthedesigneffort.
The Concept of Certification
Certification is a legalistic term. It implies an organizational standing such that the certifier or
certifying agency has the power to determine if a system can be used and under what
conditions. Certification implies sound methods that have met the tests of time, validity, and
reliability. It suggests protection of the public from hazards generated by systems that have
been poorly designed and/or from operators that are unqualified or unable. Certification is a
novel concept in human factors, at least from the viewpoint of some stand alone process
separate and distinct from the engineering aspects of system development. Human factors
professionals must ask themselves if they really want to become involved in certification and if
so why?
In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration already carries the responsibility
for certifying aircraft and personnel in aviation. It also certifies its own equipment and the
people who control and maintain the airspace system. Most of this legal requirement is handled
by subject matter experts who are flight examiners, controllers, and hardware systems
specialists. In the past, the role of human factors personnel has always been in the background
and has been principally advisory to those who would actually sign off on an aircraft or other
system. While human factors as a science may have been viewed as an information source, it
has been the exception rather than rule for anyone in the business of certification to ask the
advice and council of human factors specialists.
One partial exception is recalled by these authors. This was an effort to provide the
designers of the Automated En Route Radar Air Traffic Control (AERA) with empirical
validation of a construct called "workload probe." The probe was a computer algorithm that
would theoretically predict controller workload up to 20 minutes in advance based on weather
and anticipated traffic. It was tested in simulation at the FAA Technical Center. Measures of real
time controller workload were collected using a Cooper-Harper type scale called the air traffic
workload input technique (ATW1T). The results of the workload predictions from the probe
were significantly correlated with participants self ratings using ATWIT and with ratings by
over-the-shoulder observers. This proved that the concept of workload probe was viable, but it
hardly qualified as certification since AERA as a system is not yet ready for certification testing.
However, the process of empirical testing could be viewed as model for future systems
evaluation. Human factors are here to stay in one form or another and has the support of
Congress based on law.
The Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 led to an increased awareness of the possibilities
of human factors in the air space system. It required the FAA in particular to expend a finite
portion of its annual budget in human factors related to new systems under development. One
of the most visible products resulting from the Act has been the National Plan for Human
Factors (FAA, 1991). This is a very comprehensive document which theoretically defines the
human factors research needs for the present and the foreseeable future. One is struck by the
magnitude of the document and the implication/admission that there is a great deal which is not
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currentlyin thecorporatebodyof knowledgeconcerning person-machine systems and
subsystems in aviation.
Within the domain of aircraft certification, the plan states the following: " The FAA is
responsible for the human factors evaluation and certification of aircraft. The personnel most
responsible for this job are FAA certification pilots. These pilots are finding it very difficult to
keep up with the human factors implications of the latest developments in flight deck
automation and advanced technology aircraft." The suggested solution is the development of
handbooks, checklists, and special courses.
While "certification" is cited in the chapter on aircraft from an aircraft perspective,
conceptually it does not appear within the aircraft maintenance section of the plan. There are,
however, a variety of research related issues to include the old standbys of selection and
training as well as an expressed need to define the task structure more thoroughly.
The plan also notes that "... airway facilities personnel problems and needs have remained
largely ignored" (FAA, 1991). These men and women work unseen behind the more
glamorous positions of pilots and controllers. They maintain equipment, some of which retains
vacuum tubes and most of which was designed without any reference to even common
standards of ergonomic considerations. There are FAA standards of system maintainability, but
it is notable that the plan does not address any issues related to certification of those standards
or for that matter to the test equipment that personnel will use to accomplish the maintenance
task. It does imply, however, that additional work will be necessary to evaluate such factors as
maintenance documentation (an often ignored area of system operations) and the approaches to
diagnostic support requirements.
It should be noted that airway facilities currently use a certification process. Before a new
piece of equipment or a piece of equipment that was taken out of service for maintenance or
repair is placed in service in the national airspace, it must be certified. That is, a piece of
equipment, such as a radar, must be "certified" to be performing its intended function
acceptably and within specified tolerances before it can be placed in service in the national
airspace system. Of course, this does not mean the equipment is well designed, user-friendly,
or even maintainable. It simply means that the required function is being accomplished.
The issues this process raises from an airways facilities perspective is that if a piece of
equipment, a facility, or a system is accomplishing its intended function, how is human factors
certification going to enhance this process? What are the criteria to be applied that say, "This
piece of equipment or system is working better now (i.e., safer) than it would have if it were
not human factors certified." Even if we are invited to certify newer items/systems designed to
meet acceptable criteria, how can we certify older pieces of equipment that were not designed to
human factors principles or standards?
These practical issues suggest that if certification is to become a reality, we should be
prepared to support it for a long time, since existing equipment may still be in the field 10-20
years from now; and that a certification process must provide a value-added dimension (e.g.
safety, reliability, maintainability, etc.), or else why do it at all. Additionally, certification of the
individual cannot mean that the person has expertise in all areas of human factors, since the
field has simply become too diverse to maintain proficiency in all domains.
Certification of air traffic control systems is traditionally accomplished by air traffic
controllers and operational test and evaluation personnel. In the past, human factors personnel
have been involved in research and development of new systems and to some extent in OT &E.
However, human factors has not been considered a major element of the testing process but
rather as a necessary adjunct or from a program managers perspective, a less than necessary





addressescertificationprimarilyfromthe perspective of controller personnel issues.
Introducing human factors into the certification process beyond what is cited in aircraft
systems already will require a cultural change of the magnitude invoked by the Department of
the Army MANPRINT program (Booher, 1990). In the introduction of his book, Harold
Booher writes:
People are both the cause and the solution. People are both the benefactors and the
victims. Through human error in design, operation, or repair of machines, others are
hurt killed or made unhappy or, at the least, inconvenienced. On the other hand, it is
through human intelligence and unique human skills that equipment, organizations and
knowledge enhancing products are designed and operated effectively, efficiently, and
safely. (P. 2)
Booher sees the solution to these issues as a reorientation from hardware to people and
conceives the mechanism to achieve this organizational change as "Total Quality Management."
In MANPRINT, the goal is to integrate human factors into every level of material
development. This requires a complete systems view of each new piece of technology or
hardware. It is mandated though Army regulations. This is both a program and a philosophy of
system development. While the program is formally limited to the U.S. Army, the philosophy
could go well beyond to other high reliability organizations in which small errors can lead to big
problems. The MANPRINT philosophy suggests that there is a long term payback for good
human factors in the initial development of a system. This is a life cycle approach to new
technology. One of the problems identified by Booher (1990) is that the benefits of early
investment in good design for long term system reliability do not usually accrue to the program
managers personally because they move on to other developmental efforts. The key to success
may be in educating all the personnel involved the process. This sounds reasonable in principle
but is not easy to implement in practice. While there have been discussions within the Federal
Aviation Administration of developing something similar to Army Regulation 602-2 (U.S.
Army, 1990), to date there is no such document in place.
Human Factors Certification of Aviation Systems
There are two central questions that are recurrent. First, do we want to be involved in the
certification process to an extent beyond what exists now - which is principally an advisory
role - when asked? Second, if we were able to see that increased participation was desired,
could we live up to the challenge? Do we have the methods and measures to go beyond our
episodic advisory role?
As stated earlier, aircraft systems certification is well institutionalized and has a history
going back before World War II. However, as indicated by the National Plan, both engineering
and human factors are theoretically accomplished by flight test pilots. This places a great deal of
weight on their shoulders which they are very willing to bear. One advantage they have over
other aviation systems, such as air traffic control and airway facilities, is that because of their
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longhistorytherearefairlywellrecognizedstandards of systems and individual performance in
the cockpit. Aircraft systems are usually, although not always, designed with clear goals for
what they are intended to do; this makes evaluation easier. Despite this, it will not be easy to
increase the role of human factors in the overall certification process because this would involve
a change in thinking on the part of the personnel currently doing the work. It could be viewed
as an additional impediment to the process.
In ground systems, the situation is probably even more complicated. First, not all systems
are designed with integrated goals other than the global desire to improve safety and
performance while reducing operator workload. These are admirable yet non-specific goals and
lend to the complexity of def'ming both system and individual performance. Can we def'me
performance and use it as criterion for evaluation during development and operational testing?
Past experience indicates that this is often a moving target which seems to progress as the
system evolves. It is further complicated by moving beyond a general def'mition of performance
with a qualitative description of what constitutes "good performance." This involves subjective
decisions by subject matter experts who may well have differences of opinion. One can only
evaluate the impact of a new system if it can be determined that it somehow is worth the
investment in time, money, and safety. This improvement can only be measured if there is
technical agreement on what "improvement" means.
From a human factors standpoint, it is not adequate to conclude that a system simply reduces
workload because it may in fact reduce the load to the detriment of situational awareness or
general alertness. It is the system performance that is the key, and the human is a critical
component of the system that can and should not be equated with a piece of hardware. There
are issues which machines do not become involved in such as motivation, esprit de corps,
fatigue, and human information processing. All of these factors can have an impact on both
human and systems performance.
In the process of evaluating a system, there are very few standards which apply
consistently. Simply meeting the minimum requirements under MIL-STD 1472D (DOD, 1981)
may not be nearly enough to adequately certify a specific application. For example, 1472D is
purposefully vague when it comes to human workload. It says that we should not overload the
operator. What constitutes an overload would vary from one application to another and for that
matter from one operator to another. There have been discussions concerning rewriting this
document for civilian aviation applications but no document has been circulated yet, although an
FAA airways facilities human factors design standard has been written and is presently under
internal review. Even when it is completed, it is likely that systems evaluation and subsequent
certification will have to be accomplished on a case by case basis focusing on the design goals
of each. For ground systems in particular, this will mean that considerable effort will be
required in order to identify and validate suitable metrics that not only meet the criteria
necessary for good measurement but have obvious relationships to performance of the systems
being evaluated.
Falling back on human factors handbooks and data from days past is useful during design
and early development of systems, but these authors believe that the bottom line of any system
should be how it really performs either in actual prototype or preferably in high fidelity
simulation before prototype testing is begun in the field.
To do either type of testing requires empirical and high quality measurement, and to date
there is no general agreement on either the measures themselves or what constitutes acceptable
performance. This is especially tree when a system is under development to replace one which
is currently operating. It can be anticipated that system change may be finite but not meteoric in
magnitude. The more subtle the anticipated differences, the more difficult it will be to
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demonstrate them using conventional measurement and statistical tools. While empirical testing
offers the evaluators an opportunity to reach out for what could be a better estimate of
operational reality, it does have its drawbacks: time and cost. It takes longer and it costs more to
follow a philosophy like MANPRINT in which human factors is integrated into the
developmental cycle and empirical evaluation is accomplished whenever possible (at least in the
ideal model of the philosophy). What this all means is that considerable effort must be
expended to develop the measurement tools that would provide adequate credibility for human
factors in the certification process. While there is a history in air side human factors, there is a
very limited but fortunately growing level of expertise in ground side operations.
Criteria for Human Factors in Certification
Once again the questions are: Do we in the civil aviation human factors community want to
become involved in the certification process and are we able to produce?
The answer the first question is: Of course we do! Even if we do not have all the answers
today and all the tools of tomorrow, we can still be of more help than we were in the past if we
are invited into the development cycle sooner. The answer to the second question is a qualified
maybe. We need to develop ground side and improve air side measurement. This will not
happen overnight despite the belief by some that it could be done very rapidly. If it has not
happened to everyone's satisfaction in the past forty years, then even with a climate change in
the engineering and system development disciplines it will still take time and resources to build
adequate measures and methods.
There are some key criteria which need to be met if human factors is ever to become a full
parmer in certification of aviation systems. The fzrst criteria to be met involves the pursuit of
organizational change. Through a Total Quality Management emphasis or though an alternative
educational process as suggested by Bother (1990), we need to produce organizational change
and recognition that human factors is needed and is valuable. This may not be something you
can mandate as the Army has tried but rather should involve attitude change out of self interest
on the part of system developers. While human factors has come along way in the aviation
community, there are still many who see it as a soft science, if they view in as a science at all.
Along with the organizational change regarding human factors, there needs to be some
change in attitude in terms of accepting that there may be better ways of doing things in the
development of new technology. The doctrine behind systems engineering is workable if the
systems engineers remember to include the operators in their designs and if they seek out
technical help related to person-machine issues. Human factors should be a system life cycle
issue and not something that is only considered for the short run until the first prototypes are
fielded. This type of thinking will show the rewards and costs of system use throughout their
life expectancy and not merely the here and now. In many cases such costs are not considered;
we live with systems that are user unfriendly and less efficient than they could be.
As human factors professionals, a critical criteria should be to never promise more than we
can deliver and to deliver all that we promise. In order to do this, we have to be in the dual role
of helping systems developers today avoid the obvious errors of design while constantly trying
to develop new and better measurement tools, which are empirical and tailorable to specific
applications. Measurement tools must be reliable and valid against systems goals. They also
must meet the test of face validity if they are to ever be employed.
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